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Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the monetary authority of Taiwan 
decreased the interest rate nine times and had every intention to maintain a 
loose monetary policy. However, the lending amounts to the construction 
industry decreased much more sharply in spite of an increased monetary 
supply. Hence, the loose monetary policy has not reduced the financial 
constraints of the construction firms in Taiwan. In this paper, we investigate 
how the credit channel of monetary policy works in the Taiwan construction 
industry. We explain the reasons for financial constraints in the construction 
industry in Taiwan. Construction firms, whose information is considerably 
opaque, are likely to be viewed as “lemons,” which accounts for the credit 
crunch policy of banking lending to these construction firms. Two strands of 
evidence support this view.  First, the borrowing terms for the construction 
industry have been more restrictive than those for other industrial firms during 
the same period of financial difficulty. Second, we determine that such 
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financial constraints vary systematically within different industry groups. The 
results substantiate that construction firms retain more internal funds for 
future investment, and the sign of the liquidity coefficient is significant in their 
investment function. The evidence shows construction firms bear most of the 











The term “heavy log” in the title of this paper is used to describe the credit crunch policy of 
banking lending,
1 while the term “camel’s back” describes the investment policy of 
construction firms in Taiwan. To be more precise, “Is it a heavy log that broke the camel’s 
back” refers to the following situation: After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the monetary 
authority of Taiwan decreased the interest rate nine times and had every intention of 
maintaining a loose monetary policy. To illustrate, the relationship between the monetary 
supply (which is proxied by M1b) and the interest rate (which is proxied by the weighted 
average loan rate of the five largest banks) is presented in Figure 1; in light of the monetary 
theory, it is very reasonable for this to be a negative relationship. Furthermore, the 
monetary authority of Taiwan decreased the interest rate nine times since 1997 Asian 
financial crisis (which is shown as the vertical black in Figure 1) with an interest rate 
decrease from 8.662% in February, 1998 to 6.228% in April, 2001. The above explains that 
the monetary authority made every effort to maintain a loose monetary policy. However, it 
is particularly important to note that the lending amounts to the construction industry 
decreased much more sharply in spite of an increased monetary supply, as indicated in 
Figure 2.
2 Hence, the loose monetary policy has not reduced the financial constraints of the 
construction firms in Taiwan. This paper explores this highly interesting phenomenon 
referred to as the “credit crunch”, with regard to construction firms in Taiwan.   
 
1 According to the definition proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), “credit crunch” is a 
situation in which the supply of credit is restricted below the range usually identified with 
prevailing market interest rates and the profitability of investment projects. See Bernanke 
and Mihov (1998) for a survey of the literature.     
2  The interval zone of the red line in Figure 2 presents this reverse trend. The growing annual 
amounts of new loans to the housing construction industry from 1998 to 2000 were 85, -30 
and -51 (in billion NT dollars), respectively. In stark contrast, the growing amounts to the 
non-housing construction industry were 195, 289 and 244 (unit: billion NT dollars), 
respectively. These reference statistics can be checked in the Financial Statistics Monthly 
(published by the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank of ROC). 40 Wang and Chang 
 
 












































































































































































































M1b ($NT billion) Loan Rate (%)
 
Data source: This figure shows the monetary supply (which is proxied by M1b and is shown as the bold 
black line on the left-hand side) and the interest rate (which is proxied by the weighted average loan rate 
of the five largest five banks and is shown as the bold, black dashed line on the right- hand side). For 
details, readers should refer to the Financial Statistics Monthly published by the Economic Research 
Department of the Central Bank of ROC. The vertical black line indicates the time-point of the Asian 
financial crisis.   
 
Certain special characteristics unique to construction firms in Taiwan provide 
interesting points of contrast when studied against non-construction firms. First, 
there are two significant investment markets in Taiwan; one is the housing markets, 
and another is the capital stock market. Real Estate has long been an expensive, yet 
durable consumption good, but it is also an excellent vehicle for investment. In fact, 
it goes without saying that construction activities have a close bond with the real, 
financial activities of macroeconomics, and have been viewed as the “the industry 
responsible for the lending business cycle” in Taiwan in that construction projects 
stimulate so many other economic activities from the cement and ceramics industries 
and the steel and iron industries to the electric appliance industries, among many 
others. Figure 3 presents time-plots of the macroeconomic conditions (which is 
proxied by the score of macro business cycle indicator and GDP growth rate) and the 
economic conditions of housing market activities (which is proxied by the score of 
real estate cycle indicator) on the Y axis. The X axis represents the time flow. Most Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 41 
 
obvious here are the very similar patterns for the macro business cycle indicator and 
GDP growth rate-not surprising that these two indicators are based on the same 
concept. This figure also shows the construction industry is always referred to the 
leading business cycle. As the vertical line presents the peaks of macroeconomic 
activity, and the coincidence pattern with real estate indicator appears in 1987, 1999 
and 2003. However, it is clear that the leading pattern for the real estate indicator 
appears in 1993 and 1996.   
 
 






































































































































































































M1b (NT$ billion) Loans for the Construction Industry ($NT billion)
 
Data source: This figure shows the monetary supply (which is proxied by M1b and is shown as the black 
line on the left-hand side) and loans to the construction industry (which is depicted as the black dashed 
line on the right-hand side). The above data are from the Statistics of the Central Bank, Taiwan. The 
vertical black line indicates the time-point of the Asian financial crisis. The vertical black dashed line 
indicates the reverse trend that will be discussed in this paper. 
 
In this regard, there has been a tremendous body of studies devoted to housing and 
business cycle. It is well worth noting that Leung (2004) provides a very good 
survey of this topic.
3 Also, since DiPasquale (1999), there has been a great deal of 
discussion on housing supply, including that of Glaeser et al (2005), Jin and Zeng 
(2004), Lai and Wang (1999), Wang and Zhou (2000), Wang et al (2000), to cite a 
few; those studies are, of course, closely related to the construction industry. From 
                                                 
3 Leung (2004) reviews the literature on the interaction of the macro-economy and the 
housing market. He especially focuses on the following topics: (1) housing and taxation; (2) 
housing and business cycles; (3) housing ‘‘long cycles’’; (4) urban micro-structure.   42 Wang and Chang 
 
these, one question arises and deserves special focus in future research: how do 
financing channels affect the corporate finance policy of construction firms. In this 
paper, we extend this question and study how the macro monetary policy via the 
banking lending affect the borrowing terms and the investment level of the 
construction firms in the case of Taiwan. Particularly, we also observe whether the 
effect is different significantly in the period of financial difficulty, where the 1997 
Asian financial crisis is taken as the cut-off points. 
 
Figure 3  Leading, Coincidence, and Lagging Relationships among the Macro 
Business Cycle Indicator, the GDP Growth Rate, and the Real Estate 
Cycle Indicator 

































































































































































Macro Business Cycle Indicator Real Estae Cycle Indicators Economic Growth Rate %
 
Date source: The lighter and black line shows the score of macro business cycle indicator, while the bold, 
black dashed line shows the GDP growth rate (%). The above data is taken from the Statistics of Council 
for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) published by the Executive Yuan of ROC. The light 
dashed line shows the score of the real estate indicator, which is taken from the Real Estate Research 
Center  reported quarterly by the National Cheng-chi University , Taiwan 
(http://www.housing.nccu.edu.tw/).  
 
Two main findings emerge from our empirical results. First, the borrowing terms for 
the construction industry are more restrictive than those for other firms. Banks 
require a higher loan rate as well as more collateral. Second, the construction firms 
tend to retain more internal funds for future investment, and the sign of the liquidity 
coefficient has remained significant in the period of the loose monetary policy since 
the Asian financial crisis. In other words, financial constraints have become more 
severe for the construction firms in times of restrictive or even during periods of 
loosening monetary policy.   
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews related Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 43 
 
literature and develops two empirical hypotheses.  Section 3 presents the 
institutional background, and in particular, compares and contrasts to the 
construction industry of two economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Section 4 briefly 
describes our database and reports the results of our first hypothesis.  Section 5 
defines the econometric model and the results of the second hypothesis; and the final 
section reviews our concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Related Literature Review and Empirical Hypotheses 
 
We give a fundamental theory of the relationship between the real investment and 
financial constraints within the context of asymmetric information to the story of 
this paper. Asymmetric information and moral hazard typically play prominent roles 
in the theory of the traditional banking finance (Allen and Gale, 2000). If 
asymmetric information makes it possible for banks to more easily discriminate 
between healthy and not so healthy borrowers, then the so-called “lemon” borrowers 
will be charged an extra risk premium, or will be required to provide more collateral. 
Moral hazard has similar implications. There are three explanations that construction 
firms in Taiwan have a higher probability of being viewed as “lemons” on the 
grounds that their information is opaque, and this partially explains the credit crunch 
policy with regard to bank lending to these firms. First, the term “lemons” is a result 
of the fact that the format of their financial statements is very different from that of 
other industries. Their revenue identification, for example, is based on “the principle 
of proportion to the construction schedule”, not on the principle of “realized” or 
“accrual” that is applied to other general industries. This discretionary makes the 
financial statements of the construction firms less transparent and, as a consequence, 
more susceptible to “earning management”. 
 
On the other hand, the financial structure of the construction industry in Taiwan is 
heavily dependent on private bank financing. Shen and Wang (2005b) points out that 
the average debt to asset ratio is 40%~50% among general industries in Taiwan. 
That is contrast with the highly elevated 65%~70% ratio in the construction industry. 
Because of the large financing needs for the activities of real estate development, the 
construction industry in Taiwan, like that in many other countries, has more 
leveraged capital structure. When risk greatly increased during the period of the 
Asian financial crisis, banks became more reluctant to lend to companies with poor 
information availability or to those with high financial leveraged risk which led to 
the weak balance sheets on the part of the construction firms. 
 
Finally, the construction firms in Taiwan are relatively small size as this contributes 
to more serious information asymmetry. These firms are characterized by the 
predominance of relatively small and medium-size businesses, with only 2.5% of 
construction firms having more than 100 employees. Very few businesses have 
access to the international capital markets. These features are significant 
consequences from certain monetary policy measures, and this leads to the 




In other word, the first hypothesis posits that the borrowing terms imposed on the 
construction industry are more restrictive, thereby reflecting the lemons effect on the 
cost of bank financing. Furthermore, in imperfect capital markets, the asymmetric 
information and moral hazard may be enough reason for firms to be financially 
constrained (Hubbard, 1995). The credit channel of monetary transmission 
mechanism states that the monetary contractions reduce bank loan supplies to the 
real sector, causing credit-constrained investment to decrease (Mishkin, 1995). The 
view of credit channel stresses the limited access to capital markets for certain 
companies and this allows for implication that there are cross-sectional differences 
in the financing and investment behavior of certain firms. 
 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) found small firms, which are most likely to be 
bank-dependent, bear most of the shocks during a monetary contraction. Along 
similar lines, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) found that tight money intensifies 
the correlation between liquidity and investment for bank-dependent firms. To 
mitigate the possibility of financial constraints, “lemons” like construction firms 
tend to retain more “cash flow (or retained earnings)” on hand for future investments 
than do other firms. Simply put, for construction firms, investment decisions are 
often seriously affected by the financing methods available to them. And this is 
certainly the case in Taiwan. At the same time, the asset size of Taiwan’s 
construction firms is relatively small, and very few businesses have access to 
international capital markets, as mentioned before; thus, the financing channel of the 
construction firms in Taiwan must mainly be through banks.   
 
In this study, we build on previous studies which hypothesize that the credit channel 
effects are likely to be most important to those firms that can be classified as 
bank-dependent borrowers. Firms that are highly bank-dependent or less healthy 
should, therefore, suffer greatly from a contraction of credit. More specifically, 
Hypothesis 2 postulates whether financial constraints vary systematically within the 
construction firms and non-construction firms. We expect that the construction firms 
tend to retain more internal funds for future investment in the period of the loose 
monetary policy since the Asian financial crisis. In other words, financial constraints 
have become more severe for the construction firms in times of restrictive or even in 
the loosening monetary policy. 
 
 
3. Institutional Background: A Comparison of the Construction 
Industry in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
 
To be sure, Hong Kong and Taiwan, two of the fastest-growing economies in the 
Pacific Rim, share many similarities in their housing market. For example, both have 
a highly dense population on their small islands and as a rule a thumb, their people 
like to invest in real estate, in particular. Moreover, the literature on the structure of 
the Hong Kong and Taiwan housing markets is closely related since they both have Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 45 
 
                                                
the pre-sale system
4, which is viewed as driving real estate cycle with high volatility 
(Chang and Ward, 1993; Wang and Zhou, 2000). We specifically look at the 
empirical work of Leung and Wong (2004) and Lai and Wang (1999). Leung and 
Wong (2004) have carried out an economic analysis of the construction industry in 
Hong Kong since 1990 in the context of a socio-economic environment which is 
subject to changing governmental policies. Their paper studies the construction 
industry in Hong Kong, which also experienced the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Here, 
as shown in Table 1, we compare and contrast to the construction firms of two 
island-economies, given the similarities and dissimilarities in the industry structure. 
 
3.1 Macro-Structure of the Construction Industry 
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the macro-structure of the GDP components for Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. In terms of the GDP share, the importance of the construction 
sector is comparable in both economies. There has however been toward a decline in 
building and construction share of GDP relative to other industries in both Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, the GDP share ratio dropped 
considerably from 6.2% to 2.5% in the case of Taiwan but fell less drastically from 
6.9% to 4.4% in the case of Hong Kong. Leung and Wong (2004) point out that the 
contribution of construction activities to the economy of Hong Kong is more or less 
the same as that in the United States. Compared to other Asian  countries, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan are within the middle band (South Korea is at the top, while 
Thailand is at the bottom). Pertinent here is that the declining trend is more 
significant in the case of Taiwan. Leung and Wong (2004) explain what drove the 
rapid expansion in HK in the early 90s, and they go on to explain that the subsequent 
decline seems to have been related to the government’s slow-down in the building of 
infrastructure projects and some new housing policies. However, the same reasons 
do not apply to the Taiwan, where the most promising industries shifted from 
asset-oriented firms in the 1990s to the new high-tech firms since the early 2000s. 
This trend has been less important for construction firms in Taiwan. Another 
particularly noteworthy difference is that government policy gave construction firms 
in HK more support than in Taiwan after the Asian financial crisis.
5   
 
4  Because of the lack of well-function of financing system in the early age of Taiwan’s capital 
market, developers in the housing industry tend to finance their need in a way that was very 
similar to the “internal financing of turning over“. Most developers made use of private 
banking debt, and had an obligation to pay interests at certain times. They received a 
partial amount--10% of total price--before the pre-sale in the second housing case, and 
these some amounts supplied the interests of the financing of the first-sequential case. This 
is why we refer as “turn over”. If one case in the commercial housing pre-sale 
advertisement did not go smoothly, the financing of the pre-going-case will be disturbed. 
Hence, the custom of pre-sale has a significant implication for the heavy financial risk in 
the housing industry firms. 
5 Since capital stock is one important element of GDP and is roughly the accumulation of 
investment net of depreciation, the weakening of investment also means that the stock of 46 Wang and Chang 
 
Table 1 Comparison of the Market Structure in the Construction Industry 
Panel A: The Macro-Structure 






HK: 1990s  6.9% 35% 67% 
HK: 2000s  4.4% 31% 43% 
Taiwan: 1990s    6.2% 25% 49% 
Taiwan: 2000s  2.5% 26% 37% 
Panel B: Micro-Structure on the Supply Side 
Case  B1. Number of 
Companies 
B2. Number of 
Employees 
B3. Small Size 
% 
HK: 1990s  10,505 90,112 85.26% 
HK: 2000s  19,878 135,870 87.75% 
Taiwan: 1990s    6,528 305,443  65.25% 
Taiwan: 2000s  4,002 474,983  59.35% 
Panel C: Micro-Structure on Demand Side 
Case  C1. Property 
Index 
C2. Housing 
Price/ Income   
HK: 1990s  100 -   
HK: 2000s  418 -   
Taiwan: 1990s    100 25   
Taiwan: 2000s  295 18   
 
The data of HK is from Leung and Wong (2004) for Panels A and B and from Lai and Wang (1999) for 
Panel C. The data of Taiwan is from the Statistics of Council for Economic Planning and Development 
(CEPD) for Panels A and B and from Real Estate Research Center of National Cheng-chi University for 
Panel C. The definition of “Small Size” in the case HK case is an asset size of less than 2,500,000 (HK), 
and in the case of Taiwan, is the number of employees, i.e., fewer than five people. “-“denotes the data are 
not available. 
 
Since construction represents a dual kind of consumption goods and capital 
investment goods, another way to assess the significance of the construction industry 
is to look at expenditures and investments in construction. Column A2 in Panel A 
shows that, from the 1990s to 2000s, the share of private expenditure on building 
and construction was 35% to 31% in the case of Hong Kong but only 25% to 26% in 
the case of Taiwan. It is true that the trend could be considered more stable in 
Taiwan, but even so, both Hong Kong and Taiwan, both clusters of small islands, 
had a higher percentage when compared to that in other developed countries. 
Column A3 in Panel A shows the expenditures on building and construction as well 
as its percentage share of Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (hereafter, 
                                                                                                                   
property and other infrastructure has decreased in importance in Taiwan over time. There 
was some preliminary evidence that the decline was initialized by fewer government 
projects and other infrastructure, followed by the reduction in non-residential investment 
and finally by the reduction in residential investment. Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 47 
 
                                                
GDFCF) over time
6. In percentage terms, building and construction accounted for 
about half of the total investment expenditure, with a steady decline from 67% to 
43% over the 1990~2003 period in the case of HK and a steady drop from 49% to 
37% in the case of Taiwan. In other words, the common trend in both cases was a 
declining contribution of fluctuating expenditure on building and construction. 
However, we can’t gain further insights by breaking down investment expenditure 
on building and construction into three components: residential buildings, 
non-residential buildings and other construction (e.g. infrastructure) for Taiwan.
7 
 
3.2 The Micro-Structure of the Construction Industry-- Supply Side 
 
Contractors are the main producers of construction works. Leung and Wong (2004) 
show the industry in HK is characterized by a large number of small firms but only a 
small number of large firms. In terms of the number of establishments, almost 90% 
of all contractors are very small, with value-added less than HK$2.5 million per 
company. These contractors each employ fewer than 5 persons on average. A very 
similar pattern prevails in Taiwan, and it is clearly dominated by a small number of 
disproportionately large firms. However, the number of construction firms in 
Taiwan is relatively smaller than that as column B1 (Number of Companies) and 
column B3 (the percentage of Small Size Number to Total Construction Firms) in 
Panel B indicate. This suggests that the construction industry in both cases is more 
concentrated than in other developed countries.
8 
 
3.3 Micro-Structure of the Construction Industry -- Demand Side 
 
Panel C shows the micro-structure on the demand side, which is proxied by the 
Property Price Index. Lai and Wang (1999) notes the Hong Kong housing market 
experienced a few major booms. Real estate prices in 1996, for example, was found 
 
6  To control for the effect of inflation, GDFCF is expressed in constant (2000 year) market 
prices. 
7 In the HK study of Leung and Wong (2004), in the early 1990s, the residential and 
non-residential components remained relatively stable. On the other hand, from 1997 to 
1999, residential investment grew much more quickly than non-residential investment and 
despite the negative impacts of the Asian financial turmoil. This possibly reflects the 
change in government policy towards a higher homeownership rate. But after 1999, the 
residential component declined along with the nonresidential component. 
8  As Leung and Wong (2004) and Chiang et al. (2001) also point out the entry barrier to the 
construction industry in both cases of HK and Taiwan, especially for building works, is 
relatively low largely on account of their low technological requirements. Chiang et al. 
(2002) also suggested that contractors generally have low capital requirements as they can 
obtain project financing from developers through interim payments. The only barrier is a 
resulted of the selective tendering system adopted by the government and some private 
clients in large projects, which require that contractors to have a proven track record, 
sufficient experience, and strong financial capabilities. This had deterred small contractors 
from directly being award the main contracts of large projects. 48 Wang and Chang 
 
to be even higher than those of Tokyo (see Fung, 1996). The property price index 
rose by over 50% (see the February 25, 1998 Executive Summary of the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority). In 1995, the ratio between the monthly mortgage payment for 
a medium-sized flat and the median monthly household income was as high as 73% 
(see the Hong Kong Consumer Council, 1996). Analyzing the impact of 
overconfidence in overbuilding and cycles in the real estate market of HK, Wang, et 
al. (2000) indicate that pre-sale activity has increased volatility in the real estate 
market. This phenomenon also occurs in Taiwan, but the trend is not as intense. For 
example, Chang (1995) studied the pre-sale system of Taiwan and determined it is 
also one source of market price instability. Hence, the affordability of housing which 
is proxied by the multiples of the average housing price in Taipei to the average 
year-income was sharply reduced from 25 multiples in the 1990s to 18 multiples in 
the 2000s, reflecting the recession in the real estate market after the Asian financial 
crisis, when housing prices decreased substantially. 
 
 
4. Data and Sample Basic Summary Statistics of Taiwan 
 
4.1 Data Source and Sample Selection 
 
Much of the existing literature on the distribution effect of the credit crunch focuses 
on the bank characteristics or firm size, and this may reflect the degree of 
information asymmetry. Very little is known about the specific industries. Studying 
bank loans and real estate cycles in Taiwan using aggregate, firm-level and 
loan-level data, Chen and Wang (2005a, b) examine, for example, whether or not the 
slowdown in credit growth following the Asian crisis could be attributes to a shift in 
the demand or a shift in supply.  The major empirical result shows that the large 
decline in supply was mainly responsible for the slowdown, and they identify a 
deposit drain and an increase in past due loans as the main contributing factors. 
More particularly, in their attempt to determine which types of firms were most 
affected by the credit slowdown, they conclude that smaller firms were 
disproportionately affected by the credit cutback. In our paper, we also use micro 
data of bank loans, and our unique data set allows us to investigate whether the 
credit decline showed a general credit contraction, or whether the cutback was borne 
disproportionately by certain types of firms. This paper intends to help fill this gap 
in the literature and thereby further enhance this line of research.   
 
To explore our two hypotheses, we are interested in a more detailed picture which 
comes from studies on firm level data, by way of comparison, while most previous 
studies have used aggregate data of bank loans to analyze the credit channel. To the 
best of our knowledge, this study is the first to use individual bank loan data at the 
firm level. Such data allow us to test for cross-sectional differences in bank 
borrowing among different types of firms. Furthermore, our unique individual 
transaction loan data allow us to free our results from possible aggregation bias, Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 49 
 
                                                
which was characteristic of past studies, and our results are expected to provide 
more convincing evidences, as suggested by Shen (2002).   
 
Our individual loan transaction data set is collected from Taiwan Security Exchange 
Council (TSEC hereafter) laboriously. In Taiwan and as in many countries, listed 
companies are required to send their balance sheet and income statement to SEC. 
However, when sending these two publicly available financial statements, the 
companies in Taiwan are further required to attach a “long format” financial 
statement, which describes how each item in the two publicly available financial 
statements is compiled in details
9. This long format financial statement though is not 
directly available to the public can be obtained by application of Xerox. This long 
format financial statement has recorded each loan transaction data, including the 
loan rate, bank name, loan amount and duration of lending etc. Since borrowers’ and 
lenders’ name are obtained, we also collect their financial statements if they are 
listed companies. Hence, not only loan contract information is collected, but also 
financial statements of both lender and borrowers are taken. Equipped with 
individual transaction data set, our two hypotheses can be explored. 
 
It should be noted that different countries or individuals may have different 
definitions of the term “construction”. Some may argue that “construction” should 
not be so narrowly defined such that it only includes on-site activities. Based on the 
recording method of Rowlinson and Walker (1995), construction-related activities 
include architectural, surveying and project engineering services, real estate 
development, leasing, maintenance management, brokerage and agency, property 
holding and re-sale and the ownership of premises. Leung and Wong (2004) adopt 
the above broader view for Hong Kong and find the construction industry accounted 
for 22% of GDP there, making it the second largest industry in Hong Kong. 
However, simply out of concern for pure and simple empirical results, we only take 
into account the more narrowly-defined construction activities. Following the 
definition adopted by the Census and Statistics Department of Taiwan, 
“construction” here refers to those activities undertaken by contractors for the 
construction of buildings and other structures and facilities.   
 
4.2 Comparisons of Borrowing Terms for Construction Firms and Other Firms in Taiwan 
 
Table 2 illustrates the basic properties of the borrowing terms for the construction 
firms and other firms in Taiwan and presents their descriptive analysis of basic 
summary of statistics. The data cover the 1991~2005 period. 
 
4.2.1 Borrowing terms for construction firms 
 
(1) Borrowing periods: As shown in Table 2, the number of long-period loans (over 
one year) was 2,547 (38.83％ of the full sample) during the 1991~2005 period, 
 
9  The “long” format financial statement in Chinese means “detailed” financial statement, see 
Shen and Wang (2005) discuss for detailed of this data. 50 Wang and Chang 
 
                                                
whereas the number of short-period loans (less one year) was 4,013 (61.17% of the 
full sample). It seems that the borrowing period for construction firms tend to be 
short, a fact that may reflect the higher credit risk of housing construction firms that 
banks evaluate. 
 
(2) Borrowing amounts: The average amounts were $1,315 (unit: million / New 
Taiwan Dollars, with NT$33 to US$1 in 2005/12). The maximum amount of single 
borrowing was $59,600 (million), while the minimum was $13 (million). 
 
(3) Interest rate level: A total of 3,812 units belonged to a fixed interest rate of 
borrowing terms (58.11％ of the full sample). There were 1,744 units (26.59％ of 
the full sample) at various interest rates
10. Loans with a floating interest rate 
amounted to 1,004 units (15.30％ of the full sample). The average borrowing 
interest rate of all samples was 8.27%. 
 
(4) Collateral: There were 4,545 units that had collaterals (55.67% of the entire 
sample) and 2,015 units that did not require any collateral (44.33% of the entire 
sample). Looking at the different species of collateral in detail, we note that the 
group in real estate, e.g. land, had the largest proportion, 31.61%, of the number that 
had collateral and that those in movables had the second largest (23.12%). Those in 
securities shared 22.62%. The evidence clearly and reasonably explains that the 
causes of a financial or banking crisis can partially be blamed on the sharp decrease 
of this type of collateral value. 
 
4.2.2 Borrowing terms for non-construction firms 
 
(1) Borrowing periods: The number of long-period loan terms (over one year) was 
5,209 units (43.96％ of the full sample) during the 1991~2005 period, whereas the 
number of short-period loans (less one year) was 6,641 units (56.04％ of the full 
samples). Comparing these figures with those of housing construction firms, we are 
left with no doubt that the loan periods for non-construction firms (43.96%) tended 
to be significantly longer than those for construction firms (38.83%). 
 
(2)  Borrowing amounts: The average amount was 1,732 (million). The largest 
amount of single borrowing was 135,498 (million), while the smallest amount was 
10 (million). The most significant difference here lies in the fact that the loan 
amounts of construction firms were definitively smaller, in all likelihood indicating 
that bank lending policy is considerably tighter for construction firms in Taiwan. 
 
(3)  Interest rate level: A total of 8,034 units belong to a fixed interest rate of 
borrowing (67.80% of the full sample), while 2,234 units (18.85% of the full sample) 
had various interest rates, and another 1,582 units (13.35% of the full sample) had 
 
10 The term “variable” also means “changeable”. For example, if something happened, the 
interest rate can be changed to another level. The term “variable” interest rate is used to 
control for the agency problem. Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 51 
 
floating interest rates. It is worth noting that the average loan interest rate was 6.87% 
for non-construction firms, a rate that was 1.40% lower than that of construction 
firms. Equally important is that this probably reflects the default risk premium that 
“lemons” are forced to pay because many construction firms have closed their 
business operations since the financial crisis because of the high financial leverage 
of capital structure. 
 
(4) Collateral: There were 6,929 units that required some type of collateral (58.47% 
of the sample) in the non-construction industry and 4,921 units that did not have any 
(41.53% of the sample). It should be noted that among non-construction firms, the 
species of collateral can be broken down as follows: securities had the largest 
proportion share with 35.04% of the total number that had collaterals, and movables 
had the second largest share (32.57% of the total number that had collaterals). Real 
estate, that shared the largest proportion among construction firms, only had a share 
of 29.05% for non-construction firms.   
 
We performed a t-test on our comparison of borrowing terms across industry groups, 
i.e., construction firms and non-construction firms. The evidence generally supports 
the first hypothesis. That is, the construction sector likely faces more credit 
constraints and, as a consequence, may react strongly to monetary policy measures. 
The loan terms for construction firms are more restrictive-- for example, they are for 
a shorter period (61.17% vs. 56.04%), for smaller amounts ($1315 vs. $1732 million) 
and have higher interest rates (8.27% vs. 6.87%). The extra cost of capital for 
construction firms (1.40%=8.27%-6.87%) reflects the default risk premium that 
“lemons” must pay. It could be viewed as the accelerated factor to impetus leading 
to declining operations in what was once a bearish real estate market. 
 
 
5. Econometric Specifications and Empirical Results 
 
Based on the theory of information asymmetry, construction firms in Taiwan have a 
higher probability of being considered as “lemons”, and this may account for 
explaining the credit crunch policy that banks adopted when it came to lending to 
these firms. For the most part, banks may respond to monetary restrictions, not only 
by generally restraining credit, but also by applying more stringent lending policies 
on those customers that are perceived as being less credit-worthy. From this 
perspective, we look at two conditions from the credit channel in the construction 
industry. Firstly, we compare the borrowing terms of construction firms with those 
of non-construction firms. If our argument is correct, the borrowing terms of 
construction industry are more restrictive. This hypothesis had indeed been 
supported in Section 4.2. 
 
Secondly, we observe the physical investment behavior during the period of Asian 
the financial crisis. At the end of 1997, the local Taiwan crisis, echoing that caused 
by the Thai and Indonesian crises caused Taiwan to experience a sharp and 
unanticipated economic depression. This, in turn, triggered a series of unprecedented 52 Wang and Chang 
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For detailed definitions of borrowing terms, see Shen and Wang (2005a). The time period for all loan transactions is from 
1991~2005. ( ) represent the particular group percent of the entire sample. ***, **, and * denote the significant level at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
For the first hypothesis, the banking crisis unfolded with heavy losses, and just as 
the domestic interest rates rapidly increased in response to swift monetary 
restrictions to restore market confidence, asset markets (of stocks and real estate) Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 53 
 
began to collapse. However, with the monetary authority of Taiwan’s Central Bank 
taking reverse actions in an attempt to quickly help the economy recover, within one 
year after the Asian financial crisis, the same authority had decreased the interest 
rate nine times and implemented plans to maintain a loose monetary policy. Here, 
we put forth the position that bank-dependency is one of the sources of potential 
financial constraints for physical investment and that such changes in monetary 
policy as changing bank loan supplies could have greatly affected the severity of the 
constraints. Thus, we argue that the construction firms had to bear most of the 
reductions in bank loans when money was tight. In other words, we investigate 
whether there were asymmetric effects in cross-sectional in and out of periods. The 
following section checks the second hypothesis which posits construction firms 
should retain more cash-holding for future investment. There are three sub-sections, 
the first of which discusses models of the specifications while the second defines the 
variables including all regressions and the final section presents the empirical 
results. 
 
5.1 Econometric Models 
 
In this sub-section, we investigate the effect of monetary policy on the financial 
restrictions. In line with Kashyap and Stein (1997)’s two stages, we use non-linear 
procedures. In the first stage, we run separate cross-section regressions for each time 
period and each industry class (This is also called panel data type). From each 
regression, we obtain a coefficient for each financial restriction. In the second stage, 
we repeat a time series of these coefficients on a monetary policy measure for each 
industry class. This second regression provides a notion as to how monetary policy 
affected the financial constraints for different industries. In the first stage, we 
parameterize the model more parsimoniously than the error correction model, as 
only the coefficients on the financial constraint are of interest. Consistent with 
Kashyap and Stein (1997), we include a lagged dependent variable and the cash flow 
variable in the first stage of the model. We discuss this in more detail in the 
following.     
 
Studies of the sensitivity of investment to credit channel typically employ the 
following regression (Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson, hereafter, FHP, 1988):   
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) t i t i t i t i t i i it K p K p K Liq Q K I , 1 , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 ε β β β β μ + + + + + = − − +     ( 1 )  
T t N i   ....,   , 2   , 1    ,     ....,   , 2   , 1   = =  
where subscript i denotes the i-th firm; t denotes the t-th period;  I  is the gross 
investment; Q is Tobin’s Q;   is the value of liquidity;  Liq p  is sales plus the 
changes in inventories, standing proxy for the income effect of investment;  K  
denotes capital, equal to long-term debt plus equity which serves as a scale variable; 
and sub-T  and  N   index  over T  periods,  and  N   firms,  respectively. 54 Wang and Chang 
 
The liquidity coefficient, 2 β , which is the focus of FHP, indicates the sensitivity of 
investment to liquidity. A significant  2 β   implies that investment is sensitive to the 
liquidity, whereas an insignificant  2 β  implies that it is not. Because a firm may 
invest more and retain more cash flow or retained earnings (the proxy to liquidity) 
due to potential future investment opportunities and not due to financial constraints, 
we include    which we use to remove these opportunities. The financial leverage, 
however, plays no role in the above FHP model. In this paper, we re-write the 
equation (1) as follows: 
Q
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where Year is the dummy variable. If a certain year is in the period of 1997~2000 
(after the Asian financial crisis), the Year dummy is 1; otherwise, it is zero. R is the 
interest rate and represents the effect of monetary policy. Kashyap and Stein (1997) 
argued that most central banks use the re-discount rate or short term interest rate 
(which is proxied by the weighted average loan rate for the five largest banks in 
Taiwan) as the operating target of monetary policy. We use these two proxies. For 
details, please refer to Table 6. We account for the economic intuition behind these 
equations in the following:   
 
1. According to the above finance theory:   
(1)  If the firms belong to the construction industry, they may face more serious 
information asymmetry and have a relatively weak banking relationship; thus, 
construction firms need to maintain more liquidity because they may not be 
able to obtain funds from bank loans, which suggests a positive
) 1 (
2 β . 
(2)  Alternatively, non-construction firms can obtain funds from bank loans 
relatively easily, and hence, they tend to keep less cash on hand, which 
suggests an insignificant 
) 2 (
2 β .  
 
2. According to the literature of banking finance, monetary policy has a greater 
influence on “lemons” (e.g., lower-net-worth firms or high-leverage business), and 
thus,  . This effect was more obvious, after the financial crisis. To 
sum up, our financial constraint hypothesis is simply a question of jointly testing 
  | ) 2 (
1 |      | ) 1 (
1   |   α α f
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5.2 The Definition of Variables and Basic Statistics 
 
The liquidity variable is typically proxied by the holding of corporate cash and its 
equivalents
11 (Houston and James, 2001), or the operating cash flow (OCF) (Hoshi, 
Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991; Gibson, 1995). We also take into account two 
proxies for the robustness test. The reasons for including other explanatory variables 
will be discussed in the following. We refer readers to FHP for detailed arguments.
12 
 
( ) I es Expenditur Investment      
The definition of  I  is the flow amount of gross investment, which is measured as 
the change of fixed assets gross investment (such as plant property and equipment) 
for the non-construction firms and the inventory of land for the construction firms. 
 
Tobin’s    Q
As is traditional standard in studies on investment spending, we first run the 
regression based on the Q  theory. In a perfect capital markets, the level of 
investment should only be related to the profitability of a firm’s investment 
opportunities, and should be unrelated to a firm’s internally generated cash flow.
13 
This theory predicts that   should be the only determinant of investment if 
external financing does not matter. Here,    refers to average  , and is measured 
by the ratio of the market value of outstanding stock divided by the book value of 
total assets taken to the replacement costs in the next period to reflect the future 





() P Production  
We include lagged production in the regressions, where production is defined as 
sales plus the change in the inventory of final good. This accelerator effect is 
important in the literature on empirical investment despite the lack of a compelling 
theory behind it. 
( ) ( ) INDU INDUSTRY K Capital riables Control Va Dummy       , :      
  ( ) YEAR YEAR Dummy      and    
                                                 
11  This is equal to the cash holdings plus short-term securities. This is a concept of stock. But, the operation cash flow is a concept of flow. 
12 In the literature, the interpretation of financial variables like cash flow being indicative financial constraints, has been discussed 
in Hubbard 
(1997) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997).   
13 This is typically referred to as Modigliani and Miller Proposition I (M&M I). The proposition states that it is completely irrelevant how a firm 
chooses to arrange its finances. High liquidity signals that the firm has done well and is likely to continue doing well. Thus, more liquid firms have 
better investment opportunities; hence, when determining the investment effects of liquidity, we include Q to control for the expected profitability 
of investment when determining. 
14 As for the arguments concerning marginal Q and average Q, see Hayashi (1982). In reviewing such studies, we are struck by the variety and 
complexity of the procedures used to estimate Q. Perfect and Kenneth (1994) provided a good summary of the different methods and their 
deficiencies. In this paper, we use the common method defined by Lang and Litzenberger (1989).     56 Wang and Chang 
 
Following the existing literature, we deflate the variables Investment (I),, Liquidity 
(LIQ), and Production (P) by the level of the beginning of period capital stock to 
eliminate the effects of scale. To the extent that the firm-specific effects on 
investment, we include originally industry dummy variables in the regression to 
capture some of these effects. Our sample industries can be further classified into 
construction (INDU = 1) and non-construction industries (INDU = 0). This excludes 
the bias that liquidity is likely to proxy well for the value of investment 
opportunities in a certain industry. To weed out macro shocks, we also include a 
yearly dummy.   
 
() ε   Residuals  
ε  is a mean-zero residual reflecting any mis-measurement of , optimization 
errors, and other omitted factors that could affect firms’ investments.   
Q
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the four explanatory variables. The 
means of  it it K I ,  1,  , − t i Q 1 , 1 , − − t i t i K Liq   (liquidity has two proxies: OCF and CASH; 
see Section 4.2.2 for more details) and  it it K P  are 0.756, 9.442, 5.395(OCF), 
8.437(CASH), and 2.571, respectively. Also reported are the standard deviations 
along with the maximum and minimum values of these variables. Most variables, 
() t i K I , , , and 1 , + t i Q ( ) 1 , − t i K P , display an obviously higher volatility, and their 
standard deviations are much larger than their means. It is worth noting again that 




Table 3  Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for Construction Firms in Taiwan   
 
Variables Mean  Std  dev.  Max  Min  Skew.  Kurt. 
() t i K I ,  0.756 0.435 3.452 0.127 2.445 5.704 
1 , + t i Q   9.442 17.549 41.558 0.775 9.447 17.425 
OCF:() 1 , − t i K Liq  5.395 8.870 12.918 -3.568 -2.449 1.563 
CASH :() 1 , − t i K Liq  8.437 5.902 15.402 9.442 1.079 4.553 
() 1 , − t i K P  2.751 2.445 8.995 0.904 1.215 1.395 
Variable Definitions: 1. I (Investment, Capital Expenditures): The increased amounts of gross investment, which is measured as 
the change of expenditures on fixed assets gross investment (such as plant property and equipment) for the non-construction firms 
and the inventory of land for the construction firms.2.Q: Market Value/Book Value, which is measured as the ratio of the market 
value of outstanding stock divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets. 3. Liquidity: There are two proxies. (1)OCF: 
Operation cash flow which is measured as net income before extraordinary items and depreciation, and this cash is from the 
normal activities of business. (2) CASH: cash plus cash equivalents and short-term securities. 4. Sales: Revenue in sales. 5. K: 
capital which is measured as long-term debt plus equity. The period for all variables are 1991~2005.  
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5.3 Empirical Results 
 
This section shows the results of the relationship between the liquidity and 
investment relationship. The evidence fully confirms the notion that firms belonging 
in construction industry increase their reliance on their own internal funds when they 
have a need for financing need to partake in investment opportunities.   
 
Table 4 presents the results with different model specifications, in accordance with 
the industry group (the construction and non-construction industries). To conserve 
space, we briefly summarize our results and do not report the coefficients of the 
dummy variables. Eq. (1a) and eq. (1b) focus on the hypothesis: 
. As mentioned earlier, the construction firms may face more 
serious information asymmetry and have a relatively weak banking relationship. 
Thus, construction firms need to maintain more liquidity because they may not be 
able to obtain funds from bank loans, which suggests a positive . Alternatively, 
non-construction firms can obtain funds from bank loans relatively easily, and hence, 
they tend to keep less cash on hand, which suggests an insignificant  ).  












First of all, we present the results of the liquidity coefficients estimated using the 
OLS. If the proxy for liquidity is OCF (Operation Cash Flow), the estimated 
coefficients are 1.438 and -0.965 for the sample of construction and 
non-construction firms, respectively. But only the coefficient for construction 
industry is significant at 5% level. Apart from this, when we change the proxy for 
liquidity to CASH (cash plus the cash equivalents and short-term securities), the 
estimated coefficients are 1.892 and 1.247 for the sample of construction and 
non-construction firms, respectively. Both coefficients are significant at the 10% 
level at least. The results may indicate the liquidity reserved by Taiwan’s firms is the 
broad definition of cash in general, measured as cash plus the cash equivalents and 
short-term securities. The above results seem to definitively support our second 
hypothesis that bank lending attitude truly has a disadvantageous effect on 
construction firms’ investment as shown by the fact that the liquidity coefficient is 
larger and more significant for the construction industry.   
 
For still more evidence from testing the structural change in liquidity, we include the 
interaction term of liquidity and the year dummy. If the liquidity proxy is OCF, the 
coefficients of the interaction term (Liq/K*YEAR) are 1.775 and -1.346 for the 
sample of construction and non-construction firms, respectively, but the sign is only 
significant in the construction sample. This evidence means that construction firms 
have been more financially constrained since the Asian financial crisis than other 
groups. If we use the CASH to proxy liquidity, the sign is again only significant for 
the construction sample, and the coefficient is 1.918, which is larger than 1.892 in 
the whole period. 
 
On checking the effect of monetary policy in (2a) and (2b) in Table 5, we find the 58 Wang and Chang 
 
results are fully consistent with our hypothesis at the sign of the liquidity sensitivity 
of investment to monetary policy. If the proxy for monetary policy is the re-discount 
interest rate, the estimated coefficients are –1.642 and 1.136 for the sample of 
construction and non-construction firms, respectively. Both coefficients are 
significant at the 10% level. If the proxy is the short-term loan interest rate, the 
estimated coefficients are –1.778 and 0.948, respectively. In this case, the sign is 
negative for construction firms but positive for non-construction firms. And, the 
former value is almost twice large as the latter.   
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2 0.375 0.286 0.271 0.229
The sensitivity measure is different in the two groups. When firms belong to the non-construction firms, they can 
obtain funds from bank loans relatively easily, and hence will keep lower liquidity on hand, suggesting an 
insignificant coefficient. On the other hand, construction firms need to maintain more liquidity because they may 
face information asymmetry more seriously, suggesting a positive coefficient. ***, **, and * denote the significant 
level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
These findings can be interpreted in two ways. First, the monetary policy seemingly 
has less of the expected effect on construction firms. The degree of financial 
constraints on construction firms has diverse direction to the loose monetary policy 
(for example, lower interest rate). On the contrary, the construction firms seem to 
retain more cash on hand. Secondly, after the Asian financial crisis, the monetary 
authority decreased the interest rate and intended to maintain a loose monetary Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 59 
 
policy, and the loan amounts to construction industry sharply decreased. Thus, 
construction firms were forced to keep cash on hand for future investment, which 
explains why the liquidity coefficient is negative and significant. There is concert 
evidence showing that the loose monetary policy did not solve the financial 
constraints on construction firms. Even though the cash holdings of construction 
firms are greater than those of other industries, the features of their high financial 




Table 5  Regression Results of the Cross-Section Comparison 
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() (2b)   
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β α + α =
β α + α =
 
  The proxy to liquidity 
Model  Model A 
Re-discount rate   
Model B   
Short-term loan ate 
Industry Construct Non-Construct Construct  Non-Construct 
Intercept  0.771 (1.995)** 1.227 (1.761)* 1.013 (1.842)*  -0.854 (-1.522) 
    2 β -1.642 (-2.115)** 1.136 (1.806)* -1.778 (-2.086)** 0.948 (1.829)* 
Adj-R
2 0.296  0.201  0.273  0.176 
Notes: The number in the parenthesis is the t value. ***, **, and * denote the significant level at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Next, we re-test the structural changes for the liquidity coefficients of investment to 
monetary policy in different industries. The results are shown in Table 6. When we 
use the re-discount interest rate to proxy monetary policy in Model A, the coefficient 
before the financial crisis is 0.113 (t=1.715, at the 10% significant level). After the 
financial crisis, however, the coefficient is merely -0.208 (t=-2.109, at the 5% 
significant level). The F value for Chow test is 19.472, up to the 1% significant level. 
Regarding the group of non-construction firms, the coefficient before the financial 
crisis is 0.038 (t=1.583), but after the financial crisis, it is higher at 0.112 (t=1.802), 
with both coefficients up to the 10% significant level. The sign of liquidity of 
construction firms’ investment shifted from positive to negative both before and after 
the financial crisis. This shows that construction firms are more financially 
constrained after the financial crisis. It is abundantly clear that banks imposed more 
restrictive loan terms on the construction firms.   
 
When we employ the short-term loan interest rate as the proxy, the coefficients of 
construction firms are 0.207 (t=1.991, at the 5% significant level) and -1.125 
(t=-2.354, at the 1% significant level) before and after the financial crisis, 
respectively. The structural change is significant (F=21.432). However, the 60 Wang and Chang 
 
coefficients of non-construction firms are 0.314 (t=1.831, at the 10% significant 
level) and 0.207 (t=1.799, at the 10% significant level) before and after the financial 
crisis, respectively. And, there is no significant change (F=4.326). This robust check 
also supports the above conclusions.     
 
 
Table 6   Structural Change in the Effect of Monetary Policy on Construction Firms 
  Model A: Re-discount rate  Model B: Short-term interest rate 










































F  19.472*** 6.135*  21.432***  4.326 
Adj-R
2 0.148  0.192  0.115  0.167  0.243 0.251  0.184  0.156 
Notes: 1.1991~1997: before the Asian financial crisis. 1998~2004: after the Asian financial crisis. 2. The 





To confirm the transmission of credit in Taiwan’s monetary policy and how it 
affects the borrowing terms for construction firms and their real investment in 
Taiwan, this study posits and tests two hypotheses. Construction firms in Taiwan 
collectively represent an interesting case for the investigation of the effects of credit 
channel on business investment. This study provides policy-markers with useful 
insights into various methods to confront recession such as that after for the 
policy-makers. The main empirical results are presented in the following.   
 
First, in accordance with the theory of information asymmetry, construction firms in 
Taiwan have a greater likelihood of being viewed as “lemons”, and this helps us 
understand the credit crunch policy as far as bank lending to these firms goes. 
Clearly, the lender knows the lemon’s incentive, and therefore, he requires either a 
risk premium or collateral. Thus, we are able to determine that the borrowing terms 
imposed on the construction industry are more restrictive than those on other 
industries. Our empirical results, as shown in Table 2, indicate that the borrowing 
terms for the construction firm are more restrictive than those for other firms; more 
specifically, they are for shorter periods of time, in smaller amounts and at higher 
interest rates. What this means is that the cost of capital for construction firms is 
considerably higher.   Evidence of the Credit Channel in Taiwan’s Construction Industry 61 
 
 
Second, we run the investment regression and intend to try to capture the effect of 
such monetary policy. The liquidity coefficient, which is our focus, shows the 
sensitivity of investment to liquidity. We argue that those firms that belong to the 
construction industry, most probably face more serious information asymmetry, and 
they may need to maintain more liquidity because they may not be able to obtain 
funds through bank loans, suggesting a positive liquidity coefficient. In sharp 
contrast, non-construction firms are more likely to obtain funds from bank loans 
relatively easily, and hence, they tend to keep less cash on hand, suggesting an 
insignificant liquidity coefficient. Moreover, this effect has been more obvious since 
the financial crisis. Based on the results shown in Table 3 and Table 4, the 
construction firms retained more internal funds for investment opportunities, and the 
liquidity coefficient is significant. On the other hand, the effect of monetary policy 
from the channel of firms’ balance sheets is negative and insignificant particularly 
for the construction firms after the Asian financial crisis.  In other words, bank 
lending attitude has a disadvantageous effect on the investments of different 
industries.    
 
Since the Asian financial crisis, the monetary authority has decreased interest rate 
and made efforts to maintain a loose monetary policy. Compared with increases in 
the amounts banks lend to the non-construction industry, the borrowing terms for the 
construction industry have been sharply restricted. But, by any measure, the loose 
monetary policy has not helped mitigate the effects of financial constraints on the 
construction firms. The sign of liquidity of construction firms’ investment shifted 
from positive to negative before and after the financial crisis. This attests to the fact 
that the construction firms have been more financially constrained since the financial 
crisis. On the weight of the evidence here, there can be no denying that banks in 
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